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ABSTRACT
In this paper I discuss the so-called problem of creeping minimalism, the problem 
of distinguishing metaethical expressivism from its rivals once expressivists start 
accepting minimalist theories about truth, representation, belief, and similar 
concepts. I argue that Dreier’s ‘explanation’ explanation is almost correct, but by 
critically examining it we not only get a better solution, but also draw out some 
interesting results about expressivism and non-representationalist theories of 
meaning more generally.
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1. Introduction
Since James Dreier (2004) introduced it, the so-called problem of creeping min-
imalism has threatened metaethical expressivism. The problem is that expres-
sivism becomes indistinguishable from realism, its arch rival, once expressivists 
start accepting minimalist views of various concepts like truth, reference, rep-
resentation, and belief. In this paper I argue that Dreier’s own solution to the 
problem is nearly correct, but that by critically examining it several interesting 
points emerge. These concern not only metaethical expressivism, but some 
ideas which are common in the wider debate about theories which fall under 
labels like expressivism, but also pragmatism and non-representationalism, and 
have received increasing philosophical interest in recent years.1
After stating the problem, I explain Dreier’s solution, according to which 
expressivists exclude ethical facts and properties from explaining ethical mean-
ing, while realists do not. I use an objection from Chrisman (2008) to develop 
three important points:
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2   M. SIMPSON
(1)  The problem should be recast: we should distinguish expressivism from 
representationalism not realism.
(2)  We should not assume too much about the ontology involved in 
representation.
(3)  We should focus on explanation in order to solve the problem.
I then offer an alternative solution. While Dreier rightly focuses on explanation, 
instead of focusing on ethical facts and properties we need merely say that 
expressivists are distinctive in excluding representation from their explanation 
of ethical language and thought, as well as things that could plausibly reduce 
representation. Doing so is enough to protect expressivism from the problem 
of creeping minimalism.
I then use this solution to illuminate other solutions to the problem, and 
further questions about expressivism and non-representational theories of 
meaning more generally. I argue that given my three key points, we can answer 
Christine Tiefensee’s (2016) worrying argument that even the most central phil-
osophical resources of three prominent writers – Chrisman, Michael Williams, 
and Huw Price – cannot solve the problem. I show that these views survive 
Tiefensee’s objections; they also give us an especially interesting insight into 
Price’s notion of e-representation. These conclusions are valuable not only for 
understanding metaethical expressivism, but for understanding concepts from 
the debate about non-representationalist theories of meaning in general, a 
debate in which Chrisman, Williams, and Price are all engaged. Finally I answer 
some lurking objections to the solution, concerning the impact of minimalism.
2. The problem
The problem of creeping minimalism is that once expressivists accept minimal-
ism about various notions including truth, reference, belief, and representation, 
it’s hard to distinguish their view from their supposed rival, realism. The problem 
develops like this. The most distinctive expressivist view is that ethical language 
and thought differs from other kinds in an interesting way: it is in some way 
a different kind of thing to other kinds of thought and language. Expressivists 
have characterised this difference in various ways. They have said that ethi-
cal language is not truth-apt or descriptive; it does not express propositions, 
state facts, or refer to properties; ethical thoughts are not beliefs, or else they 
are not representational beliefs. This contrasts both with realism, which denies 
all of these claims, and with what expressivists might think about other kinds 
of language, such as the language we use to describe ordinary objects in our 
surroundings.
The problem of creeping minimalism arises because expressivists now accept 
so-called minimalist views which collapse any distinctions drawn in these terms.2 
Briefly, such views entail that even by expressivists’ own standards, ethical 
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language and thought does have the features listed in the previous paragraph. 
Roughly, minimalism about truth, representation, and other similar features 
entails that if a given sentence or thought has content that can be stated using 
a ‘that’-clause, then it has the full range of those features. So since expressiv-
ists accept that a sentence like ‘stealing is bad’ means that stealing is bad, and 
that the corresponding thought is the thought that stealing is bad, if they also 
accept minimalism they will accept that ‘stealing is bad’ has the relevant range 
of features. The sentence expresses a proposition, namely the proposition that 
stealing is bad; it describes or represents stealing as bad; it is true iff stealing 
is bad and is therefore truth-apt; it expresses the belief that stealing is bad; it 
ascribes the property badness to stealing; if stealing is bad it expresses or states 
a truth or fact, namely the truth or fact that stealing is bad, and if this is so then 
we can say the property badness exists.
As Dreier notes (2004, 25), minimalism is attractive to expressivists because 
it allows expressivists to accommodate ordinary ethical practice, which involves 
talk about truth, knowledge, description and representation.3 Expressivists think 
that minimalism lets them straightforwardly explain these practices, once we’ve 
explained what it is to make an ethical assertion.
The problem of creeping minimalism is that expressivists seem committed 
to minimalism about all the features which they may previously have denied 
apply to ethical language and thought. It is therefore difficult to distinguish 
between expressivism-plus-minimalism and realism. We can see this in action in 
particular in recent work by Simon Blackburn. On minimalist grounds, Blackburn 
accepts that there are ethical truths and propositions, that such things represent 
ethical facts (Blackburn 1998, 79), that such truths and facts can be mind-in-
dependent (Blackburn 1998, 311–312), and that ethical thoughts are beliefs 
(Blackburn 2010, 4). To see how far Blackburn takes this idea, note how in a 
recent paper, he explicitly accepts the three defining theses of Richard Boyd’s 
moral realism (Boyd 1988), exactly as Boyd states them, saying: ‘I agree to all 
these claims’ (Blackburn 2015, 843). So, the problem of creeping minimalism 
goes, what is the difference between Blackburn and Boyd, between expressivism 
and realism, once expressivism goes minimalist? Not everybody agrees on who 
is affected by this problem – which philosophical view suffers if the problem 
remains unsolved. Some think it is a problem for expressivism; others, including 
Dreier (2004, 31), think it is a problem for metaethicists, of making sense of the 
different views on offer. Some think that it is a problem for realism; for instance 
Blackburn sometimes claims that given minimalism, realism loses its content 
(1998, 294–298). I will remain neutral on this. It’s also important to note that 
there are two distinct aspects to the problem of creeping minimalism. One is 
distinguishing expressivism from its rivals. The other is making sure we do so in a 
way that lets expressivism keep its purported epistemological and metaphysical 
advantages over its rivals (see Chrisman 2008, 347). In this paper I am concerned 
only with the first element; the other is much more difficult.
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3. The ‘explanation’ explanation
In his (2004), Dreier suggests a solution, which he calls the ‘explanation’ expla-
nation (2004, 39). This solution distinguishes expressivism and realism by their 
stance not on what features ethical language and thought has, but what fea-
tures explain its content. The ‘explanation’ explanation says that the difference 
between expressivism and realism concerns what those views say about the 
proper explanation of certain target statements, which Dreier calls ‘protected 
normative statements’ (2004, 34), like:
(E) Edith said that abortion is wrong
(J) Judith believes that knowledge is intrinsically good
He argues that expressivism and realism disagree about what constitutes the 
truth of statements like these – what it is in virtue of which they are true. Realists 
and expressivists will therefore differ over how to fill in the blank in statements 
like:
(E*) Its being the case that (E) consists in nothing more than _________
(J*) Its being the case that (J) consists in nothing more than _________
This is the first stage of the ‘explanation’ explanation: expressivists and realists 
differ over what will (constitutively) explain protected normative statements. 
Since protected normative statements are just those ascribing normative con-
tent to utterances or thought, Dreier’s view is that expressivists and realists differ 
over what constitutively explains the meaning of ethical words – what consti-
tutively explains the fact that words like ‘good’ and ‘wrong’ mean what they do.
Dreier then says how expressivists and realists differ over explanations of 
ethical meaning. On his view, realists think that what fills in the blank in claims 
like (E*) and (J*) must involve ethical facts or properties, and expressivists will 
disagree:
In particular, [says the expressivist,] to explain what it is to make a moral judgment, 
we need not mention any normative properties. (Dreier 2004, 39)
On the other hand, a realist thinks that to explain what it is to make a moral 
judgement, we need to cite ethical facts or properties to which the believer is 
related in some way. This is the second stage of the ‘explanation’ explanation: 
expressivists and realists disagree about whether normative facts and properties 
are needed to explain the fact that terms like ‘good’ and ‘wrong’ have normative 
content.
In sum: for expressivists, an ethical sentence like ‘abortion is wrong’ describes 
abortion as wrong, expresses a belief, states a truth, and so on, but it is not 
because it does any of this that it means what it does. Similarly, a belief that 
abortion is wrong represents abortion as wrong, and is true iff abortion is wrong, 
but it is not because of this that it has the content that abortion is wrong. All 
those features for which expressivists accept minimalism still apply to ethical 
language and thought, but they play no role in explaining why it means what 
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it does. Realists, on the other hand, will disagree with this: the fact that ethical 
language and thought means what it does is to be constitutively explained in 
terms of such things.4
This looks promising. Expressivists clearly aim to explain ethical language 
by saying that it expresses distinctive mental states which can be characterised 
entirely in terms of the effect they have on their possessor’s behavioural and 
emotional profile, and which can be characterised without appealing to a moral 
reality to which these states are reactions. Expressivists often claim this as a 
distinctive advantage, with Blackburn arguing that his view needs ‘no truck with 
the idea that we somehow respond to an autonomous realm of values: a meta-
physical extra that we inexplicably care about on top of voicing and discussing 
our more humdrum concerns’ (Blackburn 2010, 5). So initially it seems that the 
lack of appeal to ethical facts and properties is distinctive of expressivism.
Dreier’s account is also supported by the literature. To support his specific 
focus on facts and properties, Dreier draws on Fine (2001), Gibbard (2003), and 
Price and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1996), but there are others in the debate who 
support it too. Blackburn argues that it is definitional of what he calls ‘pragma-
tism’ (which includes expressivism) that its explanation of the relevant language 
does not cite the ontology associated with it – the ‘referents [of ] its terms, or 
truth-makers [of ] its sentences’ (2013, 75). Michael Williams concurs, arguing 
that an expressivist explanation of ethical language will be ‘ontologically con-
servative’ (2013, 143), which just means that the explanation will not appeal to 
ethical facts and properties.5 We will hear more from Price and Williams later.
The most important feature of Dreier’s solution is that it neatly avoids the 
threat from minimalism. Expressivists can accept that there are ethical facts 
and properties on minimalist grounds while denying that such things are part 
of what explains ethical content. Believing in some facts or properties doesn’t 
require accepting that they do any particular constitutive explanatory work. This 
shift to explanatory questions is what stops minimalism undermining Dreier’s 
solution.
However, Chrisman (2008, 347–348) argues that when a belief is false, realists 
cannot say that what constitutes that belief is a relation between the believer 
and a fact. If the belief is false, there is no fact for the believer to be related to. 
Suppose Suzy believes that some given instance of torture T is permissible. 
Suppose T is in fact not permissible. No one will say that her belief consists in a 
relation with the fact that T is permissible, since no such fact exists. So realism 
cannot be identified as Dreier suggests, or else we could only be realists about 
true beliefs. This would be unacceptable, since a realist will think that the same 
story should be told for what explains the content of all ethical beliefs.
Chrisman then argues that Dreier can only avoid the false belief issue by 
appealing to representation: the realist will say that what constitutes Suzy’s 
false belief is that she represents T as permissible. This is possible even though 
her belief is false, since thinkers can represent the world falsely. Expressivists 
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can then deny that representation is part of what constitutes Suzy’s belief, and 
we get our distinction.
However, Chrisman argues that this relies on a ‘distinction between rep-
resentational and nonrepresentational mental states’ (2008, 348) which col-
lapses given minimalism. The idea is that minimalism, in the same way as I 
described in Section 2, simply entails that ethical beliefs are representational, 
even by expressivists’ own standards. It therefore collapses the distinction as 
drawn above.
4. Learning from the ‘explanation’ explanation
I think that Chrisman’s objections both fail. Dreier’s account does not collapse 
for the reason Chrisman offers, and a representation-based alternative does 
not collapse under minimalism. However, I think Chrisman’s discussion raises 
some important and interesting issues concerning the problem of creeping 
minimalism.
I’m going to use my discussion of the above debate to argue for three claims. 
First, we have been conceiving of the problem of creeping minimalism in the 
wrong way. We should recast it, and then examine Dreier’s view in light of this. 
Second, Dreier’s solution focuses too much on the ontology of representation, 
and the best solution to the problem of creeping minimalism should not do 
so. Third, Dreier is right to focus on explanation, and doing so lets us refute 
Chrisman’s second objection. After establishing these three points, I will argue 
for a solution which improves on Dreier’s.
4.1. Three lessons
The first point is that we should recast the problem of creeping minimalism. We 
should aim to distinguish expressivism not from realism, but from representa-
tionalism. Representationalism says that ethical thought and language is best 
explained in terms of representation, that ethical thoughts are best explained as 
beliefs, and so on. Representationalism is not sufficient for realism. While realists 
typically accept representationalism, so do many non-realists. For example, error 
theorists are not realists, in the sense that they think there are no ethical truths or 
facts.6 But they typically are representationalists: they think ethical thoughts are 
best explained as representational beliefs. Therefore, distinguishing expressiv-
ism from realism is not the right route: error theory differs from expressivism in 
exactly the same relevant respect as realism does, over whether ethical thought 
is belief-like and representational.7
This leads neatly on to the second point. We should not focus too much on 
the ontology invoked by representational accounts. Error theory gives us a nice 
route in to this point. Consider again Chrisman’s first objection to Dreier: the 
belief that p cannot be constituted by a relation to the fact that p where it’s false 
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that p. A very natural reply to this is to point out that the realist will of course 
not think it is so constituted, but will instead say that Suzy’s belief that T is per-
missible is composed of concepts, including the concept of permissibility. This 
concept represents things as permissible, and does so in virtue of a relation to 
the property of permissibility. This route saves Dreier from Chrisman’s objection: 
it retains the explanatory role of ethical properties rather than ethical facts.
However, it is at the very least controversial whether all accounts of rep-
resentation will take this form, of appealing to a relation with properties. Start 
with error theory. The property view I just outlined would commit error theorists 
to relations between thinkers and uninstantiated properties, perhaps necessarily 
uninstantiated properties. If representation means a relation with a property, 
since error theorists think such properties are not instantiated, they can at best 
say we bear relations to properties which exist but are uninstantiated. Not all 
error theorists would want to accept this.8 So this is a drawback for Dreier’s view, 
though it is not necessarily decisive.
However, error theory is just one tricky case: there is a much more general 
point here, namely that not all accounts of representation take the property or 
fact view Dreier discusses. There are plenty of representationalist views that do 
not. Consider a propositionalist view, which takes a belief that p to be explained 
in terms of the believer bearing the belief relation to the proposition 〈p〉. Some 
take propositions to be composed of senses or concepts, which don’t require 
corresponding properties or entities. Such a view could treat my belief that 
something is F as explained by my bearing the belief relation to a particular 
proposition, yet it would not require my representing something as F to involve 
a relation between me and F-ness. Contrast this view with the expressivist, who 
doesn’t think we have to appeal to a belief relation between me and the prop-
osition 〈stealing is bad〉 in order to explain my belief.
Consider also views which say that we can believe things about non-existent 
objects. Le Verrier’s beliefs about Vulcan are still representational in a way which 
expressivists think his beliefs about right and wrong are not. But it would be 
a stretch to think that we should account for his beliefs in terms of a relation 
with an existing object, since Vulcan doesn’t exist. The same idea goes for unin-
stantiated properties. We all want to account for systematically false beliefs, for 
instance about magic or witches. Not everyone will want to accept uninstanti-
ated properties being magical and being a witch to help us explain such beliefs. 
Finally, consider adverbialism about perception (Ducasse 1942; Chisholm 1957). 
Such a view says that to see something red is to see red-ly, not to bear a relation 
with redness. Yet this view is still clearly representationalist: this view will accept 
that seeing red is best explained as representing something as red.
So this is our second point: we should not commit the representational-
ist to a specific ontological view in order to account for representation. For 
any proposed ontology, there are plenty of representationalists that will reject 
it. And we should not rule out any particular representationalist views just to 
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solve the problem of creeping minimalism, a problem, as Dreier says, in ‘met-
ametaethics’ (Dreier 2004, 31)! This point has been obscured because of the 
focus on distinguishing expressivism from realism specifically, rather than from 
representationalism.
As such, it might seem that the best route is to say this: expressivists deny 
that ethical language is best explained in terms of its being representational, 
while representationalists affirm that it is. We then decline to say anything more 
specific about what representation is. Before exploring this idea and suggesting 
an even better alternative, recall Chrisman’s second objection: isn’t this proposal 
hopeless, since expressivists won’t deny that ethical language is representa-
tional, and indeed can’t deny it if minimalism is true?
No. The whole point of Dreier’s account is that what matters is not what fea-
tures expressivists think ethical language and thought has, but which of those 
features explain the fact that ethical language mean what it does.9 It is not what 
features words like ‘good’ and ‘permissible’ have, but which of their features 
explain the fact that they mean good and permissible. Minimalism does not 
imply that the content of ethical language and thought is to be constitutively 
explained in terms of representation. It only implies that it is representational, in 
the sense that ethical language and thought can be said to represent the world. 
Though minimalism implies that ethical thought and language is representa-
tional, it does not imply that this fact helps to explain the protected statements 
Dreier identifies. Its being representational does not help to explain its meaning. 
So Chrisman’s objection completely misses Dreier’s crucial manoeuvre: the shift 
to explanation.
4.2. A better account
So, we should be distinguishing expressivism from representationalism rather 
than realism, and we should remember that the key way to do so is to read the 
two views in explanatory terms. Representationalists think that ethical language 
and thought needs to be treated as representational to be properly explained; 
expressivists do not. However, we should also not assume too much about the 
ontological commitments of a representationalist view. What, then, should we 
say about creeping minimalism?
The first thing to do is to make a defensive point. By adopting Dreier’s explan-
atory focus, expressivists can defend themselves from the threat of minimalism. 
Minimalism was a threat because it seemed to undermine the expressivist’s 
negative view: she can no longer say that ethical language is not representa-
tional. This threat has disappeared now: even if she has to say ethical language 
is representational in that it represents the world, she can deny that we should 
explain it in terms of representation. This shift to explanation neatly resolves the 
problem of creeping minimalism: minimalism no longer collapses the expres-
sivist’s view into representationalism.
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However, at this point we might ask more about what representationalism 
comes to. So far I’ve characterised it as the view that representation is required 
to properly explain ethical language and thought. But this is only a first step. For 
starters, how do we classify accounts which don’t use words like ‘representation’ 
(or ‘belief’ and ‘description’) in their theory? For instance, a reductionist view, 
perhaps one which reduces an ethical belief to a causal tracking state, would 
not mention representation in its explanation of ethical thought, yet would still 
clearly count as representational. More generally, on the above view, expres-
sivism only seems to oppose those accounts which use representation as a 
primitive – as an unexplained explainer.10
The best response to this objection is that we need simply understand the 
expressivist’s ban on explanatory roles for representation and belief as including 
anything which might plausibly serve as a reduction base for those things.11 So 
the reductionist view above rests on the idea that causal tracking is representa-
tion; her explanatory chain goes:
w means good ← w represents things as good ← w tracks goodness
(where w is just a word.) The expressivist will not accept this. Representation 
is itself trivially entailed by w’s meaning good, which is directly explained in 
terms of attitudes:
w represents things as good ← w means good ← basic sentences involving w 
express intentions, plans, attitudes …
This captures the idea that representationalists are reducing representation, 
while expressivists are not putting it in any explanatory capacity at all.
So, to conclude: Dreier’s account is right in its basic approach, but it faces two 
issues. It wrongly tries to distinguish expressivism from realism rather than from 
representationalism, and it attributes too much of an ontological commitment 
to representationalist views, perhaps because its focus is more on realism.12
Instead we should step back, and argue that while expressivists must accept 
that ethical thoughts are beliefs and that they represent the world, as do ethi-
cal assertions, they need not say this in their explanation of what gives ethical 
thought and language its content. Expressivists say that the content of ethical 
thoughts and beliefs is not to be explained in terms of representation or any 
plausible reduction base for it. This is completely compatible with minimalism.
5. Other accounts
In my view, this alteration of Dreier’s original solution distinguishes expressiv-
ism not merely from realists but representationalists in general, and does not 
collapse given minimalism. However, before we look at some potential issues 
with the new solution, it is worth applying some points from Section 4 to other 
work on the problem of creeping minimalism. I will examine Christine Tiefensee’s 
arguments against three solutions to the problem. One of these solutions is 
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Chrisman’s. The other two use two concepts recently developed by two prom-
inent non-representationalists: Michael Williams’s notion of an ‘EMU’ (an expla-
nation of meaning in terms of use) and Huw Price’s notion of ‘e-representation’. 
Tiefensee argues that none of these solutions works.
Tiefensee’s arguments are worth discussing for two reasons. First, her pessi-
mistic conclusion is cause for concern: if even the sophisticated non-representa-
tionalist machinery recently set out by Chrisman, Williams and Price cannot solve 
the problem of creeping minimalism, we might well worry that no solution is 
likely to emerge soon. Second, it turns out that every key point in Tiefensee’s 
critique can be answered by using two of the ideas I defended above: (1) by not 
focusing on the ontology of representation and belief, and (2) by recognising 
the importance of explanation.
5.1. Chrisman’s inferentialism
With this in mind let’s look at Chrisman’s idea. On the basis of his criticism of 
Dreier, Chrisman rejects representation-based approaches to the problem of 
creeping minimalism. Instead he thinks we should replace representation with 
inference as the central tool for understanding expressivism (Chrisman 2008, 
335). On an inferentialist view, the meaning of a sentence is constituted by 
its inferential role, which Chrisman takes to consist in two things: (1) what cir-
cumstances license asserting the sentence and (2) what further assertions and 
actions are licensed by asserting the sentence (2008, 350).
Chrisman argues that realists think ethical terms play a role in theoretical 
reasoning, whose premises give ‘evidential support’ to the conclusion which if 
true ‘will usually constitute theoretical knowledge about the world’ (2008, 350). 
Expressivists, on the other hand, will play a role in practical reasoning, whose 
premises ‘provide practical support for the conclusion’ which if true ‘can consti-
tute practical knowledge about how to interact with the world as we know it to 
be’ (2008, 349–350, original emphasis). As such, realists and expressivists differ 
in that the former take ethical commitments to be theoretical, while the latter 
take them to be practical.13
However, Christine Tiefensee (2016) forcefully criticises Chrisman’s account, 
arguing that it is just as vulnerable to creeping minimalism as other approaches. 
She focuses her initial objection on the distinction between practical and the-
oretical commitments. Consider the claim that ethical statements express the-
oretical commitments. According to Chrisman, this means that they express 
commitments which if true will constitute theoretical knowledge about the 
world. But Tiefensee argues that given the right minimalist theories, the expres-
sivist will accept that ethical commitments are theoretical: given minimalism 
about ‘true’, and ‘world’, she says, there’s no reason for expressivism to reject that 
true ethical commitments can constitute ethical knowledge about the world 
(Tiefensee 2016, 2443).
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I think Tiefensee is absolutely right that expressivists can accept a minimalist 
version of the claim that ethical commitments are theoretical commitments. 
However, as with Dreier, Chrisman can reply by turning to explanation. He 
shouldn’t say that for expressivists, ethical commitments are not theoretical. 
He should say that for expressivists, the fact that they are theoretical has no role 
in explaining them. A sentence like ‘torture is wrong’ has its meaning because it 
is practical, not because it is theoretical. It means what it does because it gives 
practical support for conclusions based on it as a premise. But it is still theoreti-
cal: it still gives evidential support to the conclusion, and when true it constitutes 
knowledge about the world. It’s just that this fact plays no explanatory role 
whatsoever. As with Chrisman’s objection to Dreier, Tiefensee’s objection can 
be avoided with more of a focus on explanation. This isn’t to say his solution is 
correct, just that it can avoid Tiefensee’s objection.
5.2. The EMU
Michael Williams (2013) claims that the notion of an EMU – an Explanation of 
Meaning in terms of Use – is a good way of understanding expressivism about 
ethical language as well as distinguishing between non-representationalism and 
representationalism more generally. According to him, an EMU has three compo-
nents, which I will characterise exactly as Tiefensee does (Tiefensee 2016, 2448)
(I–T) A material-inferential (intra-linguistic) component, comprising the inferential 
patterns in which a concept stands, thus determining its conceptual meaning.
(E–T) An epistemological component, specifying the epistemological circum-
stances of competent language use.
(F–T) A functional component, detailing what the concept is used for.
(I–T) is meant to specify the inferential role of a term. For instance, part of the (I–T) 
clause for a colour-word like ‘red’ will specify inferential connections between 
that word and other colour terms: from ‘x is red’ you can infer ‘x is coloured’, 
from ‘x is scarlet’ you can infer ‘x is red’, and so on. (E–T) is meant to specify the 
circumstances under which a speaker is licensed to make assertions using the 
term; for instance part of (E–T) for ‘red’ will specify that a speaker can use ‘red’ 
only to apply to objects which are clearly red. (F–T) is meant to tell us why we 
have a term of which (I–T) and (E–T) are true (Williams 2013, 135). Williams says: 
‘The F-clause appeals to use as expressive function: what a word is used to do, 
what it is useful for’ (Williams 2013, 135).
Tiefensee then suggests that we could try to distinguish realism and expres-
sivism by saying that a realist EMU will differ from an expressivist one. She sets 
out two EMUs which follow the above pattern, and points out where they match 
and where they differ. For our purposes, the crucial point is that Tiefensee thinks 
the difference between expressivism and realism will come down to what these 
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views say about tracking. Tiefensee considers the following claim: (Tiefensee 
2016, 2449, my emphasis):
(1)  In a reporting use, tokens of ‘x is good’ express reliable discriminative 
reactions to an environmental circumstance. Their role is to keep track 
of goodness, in this way functioning as language entry transitions.
What this roughly means is that ethical statements express beliefs which track 
ethical properties, perhaps in the same way that we think our language about 
our environment tracks the objects in it.
Tiefensee argues that expressivists can accept a suitably minimalist reading 
of (1). On this reading the idea that ethical statements ‘track the moral truth’ is 
just the idea that some ethical statements are true, and some people are good 
enough that they assert more or less only the moral truths, and that their moral 
statements are counterfactually responsive to the moral truth so that, for exam-
ple, if x had been good, they would have said that x was good, and if it had not 
been, they would not have said so. On this minimalist reading of tracking, an 
ethical truth-tracker is the person who gets the ethical truths right, and who 
wouldn’t easily have got them wrong. Since we’re assuming that expressivists 
can make sense of ‘getting the ethical truths right’, and can evaluate counter-
factuals involving ethical statements, they will not deny that ethical statements 
track the truth in this sense.
So, Tiefensee concludes, focusing on the notion of tracking as Williams does 
will not distinguish expressivism and realism, because expressivists will end up 
asserting the same things as the realist. And though Tiefensee does not explicitly 
say so in this passage, this is because of a minimalist reading of ‘truth-tracking’, 
which Tiefensee calls ‘i-tracking’ due to its link with Price’s ‘i-representation’, a 
concept we’ll discuss shortly.
5.3. E-representation
Tiefensee argues that as a result of this, the only way to get a distinction between 
expressivism and realism is to understand the notion of tracking in (1) as ‘e-track-
ing’, which we can make sense of in terms of Huw Price’s distinction between 
what he calls ‘e-representation’ and ‘i-representation’. Roughly, e-representation 
is a causal relation between terms and their environment, while i-representation 
is a feature emerging from relations between terms, including inferential and 
causal relations (see Price 2013, 36 for a fuller explanation). As such, a term e-rep-
resents if it tracks things in world. A term i-represents if it has the inferential role 
required to give it assertoric content. We can then read the notion of ‘e-tracking’ 
in terms of e-representation, taking the two to be more or less the same idea.
Crucially, a term can i-represent without e-representing: a term can be used 
in assertions, without having the job of tracking the world. Expressivists think 
that ethical terms are i-representational but not e-representational. We might 
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distinguish them on this basis from realists, who think that ethical terms are 
both i- and e-representational. This is just the same as saying that expressivists 
deny, but realists accept, that ethical terms e-track the world
Tiefensee argues that we need to explain e-representation in more detail, 
but that the only substantial way of doing so faces a dilemma: it yields either a 
characterisation of realism which expressivists can accept (thus failing to yield 
a distinction) or else one which realists won’t themselves accept.14 Tiefensee 
argues that on the best way of cashing out the notion of e-representation (and 
thereby, e-tracking) ethical language is e-representational just in case it has two 
features: (i) ‘reports of the presence of goodness must be caused by goodness’ 
and (ii) such reports ‘must be default justified’, i.e. ‘do not require inferential 
support from other premises’ (Tiefensee 2016, 2454). However, many realists will 
wish to deny (ii). Moreover, there are two readings of (i), one of which realists 
will reject, the other of which expressivists will accept. Either way, we don’t get 
a distinction between expressivism and realism.
Nothing in my argument will depend on whether ethical sentences are 
‘default justified’ so instead I shall focus on claim (i), that reports of the presence 
of goodness must be caused by goodness. Tiefensee begins by pointing out that 
non-naturalist realists, who believe in the causal inefficacy of ethical facts and 
properties, will reject (i). I think this is sufficient reason to reject this reading, 
since it fails to account for one of the two major forms of realism. However she 
goes on to make a further point. She argues that there are two readings of (i), 
the strong reading and the weak reading. On the strong reading, (i) says that 
‘moral properties are themselves causally efficacious and that we perceive them 
through a special, sensory moral faculty’ (Tiefensee 2016, 2454). While expres-
sivists will indeed deny that moral properties are like this, and therefore will 
deny (i) on its strong reading, Tiefensee points out that many realists will also 
reject (i) due to scepticism about the notion of a special sensory moral faculty. 
The strong reading, then, fails to be acceptable to realists, and so cannot be a 
necessary component of realism.
On the other hand, when read weakly, (i) seems more moderate: it says that 
goodness can cause reports about goodness by being identical to a natural 
property or properties which do all the causal work. So ‘whenever we detect a 
causally efficacious natural property that constitutes a moral property … we 
also perceive the corresponding moral property’ (Tiefensee 2016, 2455). This 
seems more acceptable to realists. However, Tiefensee argues, it will also be 
acceptable to expressivists, for the following reason.
The weak reading of (i), says Tiefensee, depends on the idea that moral prop-
erties are, ‘in some sense or other, nothing over and above natural properties 
such as causing pain’ (Tiefensee 2016, 2455). Expressivists, she says, can make 
that claim too, though for them it will be understood as the expression of an 
ethical claim, about what wrongness consists in (e.g. causing pain). But if this 
is so, she argues, then since wrongness just is some natural property, then if 
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those natural properties cause our ethical utterances, then it follows that ethical 
properties cause our ethical utterances. And so expressivists will be happy to 
accept (i) on the weak reading.
Tiefensee concludes that e-representation, as cashed out via (i) and (ii), can-
not give us a reasonable distinction between realism and expressivism: either it 
will not be a distinction at all or else will yield a characterisation of realism which 
realists themselves will reject. It’s worth noting at this point that Tiefensee also 
thinks of e-representation as being a mark of ontological commitment: those 
bits of language which are e-representational are the ones which carry some 
genuine ontological commitment, and as such are the ones for which realism 
is appropriate. She therefore adopts a pessimistic stance about the notion of 
ontological commitment here: no such notion has been cashed out which dis-
tinguishes expressivism from realism and which realists will accept.
To sum up, Tiefensee argues that neither Williams’s EMUs nor Price’s distinc-
tion between i-representation and e-representation can solve the problem of 
creeping minimalism. EMUs cannot help by themselves because the best EMU-
based strategy uses a notion of tracking that is acceptable to expressivists when 
understood minimalistically. When cashed out in terms of e-representation, 
either expressivists will still accept that ethical language is e-representational, 
or else realists will deny that it is.
5.4. Replying to Tiefensee
As I mentioned earlier, Tiefensee’s arguments are important because they target 
resources – EMUs and e-representation – given a central role in recent work by 
prominent non-representationalists. These arguments should worry us quite 
independently of the problem of creeping minimalism for ethics: they threaten 
some of the core components of contemporary non-representationalism. While 
I think Tiefensee’s argument fails as a whole, discussing it does reveal some 
important lessons.
First, we must recognise that it’s because Williams’s EMUs are taken to be 
explanations, that Tiefensee’s criticism of EMU-based strategies fails. Tiefensee 
claims that expressivists might be able to accept the realist’s claim about track-
ing (1), which is part of the realist’s EMU for ‘good’. But if Williams’s EMUs really are 
explanations, then the fact that expressivists can accept that ‘good’ can express 
reliable discriminative reactions is not enough to undermine this particular EMU 
strategy. More is required: expressivists need to think that (1) is part of what 
explains the fact that ‘good’ means good. They might accept (1) as true, but say 
that it doesn’t belong in the EMU for ‘good’, because it doesn’t have any explan-
atory role. In other words, even if you are good at tracking the ethical truth, you 
don’t have the concept good in virtue of this fact.
Tiefensee approaches this point herself in the final footnote in her paper, 
claiming that ‘a stronger focus on function might do the trick’, though she is 
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sceptical of this (Tiefensee 2016, n. 26, 2458). However, if we read ‘function’ just in 
the same explanatory terms as Dreier introduces and I have endorsed, then the 
‘stronger focus on function’ Tiefensee mentions can be understood as putting 
more emphasis on what explains ethical meaning. And this is precisely the route 
I want to follow. On this view, the idea Tiefensee discusses becomes the claim 
that expressivists say that ethical terms ‘establish language entry transitions’ 
(roughly that they track ethical facts), but that this fact does not explain their 
meaning. So the EMU-based solution doesn’t collapse given minimalism after all
While Tiefensee’s argument against EMUs fails, I think Tiefensee is more or 
less right about e-representation. Price’s notion of e-representation can be used 
as a mark of neither realism nor representationalism. There are two reasons 
for this. First, whether or not a given kind of language is e-representational 
depends on whether it has an appropriate causal connection with the kinds of 
objects, properties and facts that it is meant to represent. But this cannot be a 
mark of realism or representationalism in general because there will be views 
which accept representationalism (and perhaps realism too) yet deny that the 
relevant facts and properties are causally active, as Tiefensee rightly points out. 
For instance an ethical non-naturalist might think that ethical language can only 
be explained in terms of representing the world, but that the properties and 
facts it represents are not causally linked to it.15
This is one reason we can’t rest the general distinction between expressivism 
(or nonrepresentational pragmatism more generally) and representationalism 
on e-representation. The second reason is that e-representation does not have 
explanation built in. In other words, a piece of language may well be e-rep-
resentational, but this does not entail that its meaning or use is explained by its 
being e-representational. (This is why expressivists could accept that ethical lan-
guage was e-representational in Tiefensee’s weaker sense.) Since I have pinned 
the distinction between representationalism and expressivism on the issue of 
what explains the content of ethical language, e-representation is not by itself 
going to play a crucial role – we need to include explanatory considerations 
too.16 So we shouldn’t think that e-representation is a mark of the difference 
between representationalism and expressivism in ethics. More generally, there-
fore, we shouldn’t think that it’s a mark of representationalism versus non-rep-
resentationalism either.
So while Tiefensee’s pessimistic argument fails as a whole, it reveals some 
important general points about the debate about expressivism and representa-
tionalism. Moreover, we’ve seen that the main moves in this debate can all be 
better understood and answered when we appreciate that explanation is the 
key to distinguishing expressivism. Dreier and Chrisman’s points are best under-
stood in these terms, and understanding Williams’s EMUs in this way helps us 
see how we might use them to answer Tiefensee’s objections.
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6. Minimalism’s revenge
To finish I want to discuss two spanners minimalism may yet throw in the works. 
First, the solution I’ve defended seems to make minimalism incompatible with 
representationalism, a consequence we should avoid if possible. Second, min-
imalism seems to prevent expressivists from distinguishing their opponents’ 
views from their own. I will answer these in turn.17
6.1. Incompatibility?
The first worry is that minimalism about representation is incompatible with rep-
resentationalism. This is because minimalism rules out explanations in terms of 
representation – and such explanations are definitive of representationalism. This 
is a common point in the literature. In a recent paper Camil Golub rejects some 
proposed solutions to the problem of creeping minimalism for this reason (Golub 
2017, 1392f; 1406). Many writers think this point is important for the wider debate 
about non-representational theories of meaning.18 While a full answer requires 
more space than I have, I will sketch out what I take to be the best response.
It’s not clear why we should care about this supposed incompatibility. We 
might think that expressivists can live with it: if rival views are incompatible with 
minimalism, so much the worse for them. However this would make expressiv-
ists, who accept minimalism, unable to be representationalists about areas of 
language outside ethics, for instance about the language of middle-sized dry 
goods. At least some expressivists want to be representationalists in these cases, 
so they should try to answer this problem.19
The short answer is this: minimalism about representation rules out some 
but not all of the kinds of explanation which count as representationalist. Recall 
that in Section 4 I pointed out that representationalism includes at least two 
kinds of explanation: (i) those using representation as a primitive, and (ii) those 
using a plausible reduction base for representation. Minimalism only rules out 
the first of these, not the second.
While there is not enough space to fully explain why, minimalism about rep-
resentation blocks the use of representation as an explanatory primitive. In 
particular minimalism entails that any claim of the form
x means y because x represents the world in a certain way
is false. This is because representation is a trivial unexplanatory consequence 
of meaning, not the other way round. So minimalism rules out explanations of 
kind (i). Similarly, minimalism about belief rules out explanations using belief 
as a primitive.20
Minimalism also entails that representation is not reducible. Horwich takes 
minimalism to involve the view that the property in question is not constituted 
by any other property. For him this means that there is no property F such that 
(a) all and only representational terms have F and (b) (a) explains the facts about 
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representation (Horwich 1998b, 104–107). Since reductionism would give us 
such a property, it is false if minimalism is true. As such, any reductionist view 
of representation is incompatible with minimalism: minimalism rules out expla-
nations of kind (ii) above.21
However, this is no threat to the solution I’m defending. Expressivists aren’t 
primitivists or reductionists about representation. They do not think that we can 
explain any kinds of term using representation as a primitive – they usually opt 
for a causal relation like causal tracking to explain middle-sized dry good terms 
(see Blackburn 2013; Gibbard 2015). Nor do they want to reduce representation: 
they don’t think representation can be reduced to any one property, partly 
because they think that ethical terms and middle-sized dry goods terms both 
represent the world but don’t do so for the same reasons. So they will not care 
about this incompatibility. Primitivists and reductionists won’t care either: so 
much the worse for minimalism, they will say.
Moreover, minimalism about representation is compatible with some kinds 
of representationalist explanations. While minimalists cannot think that rep-
resentation itself can do explanatory work, they can say that a plausible reduc-
tion base for representation can do such work, so long as they do not say that 
representation reduces to that base. For example, an explanation in terms of a 
causal tracking relation C which denies that representation reduces to C would 
be representationalist, since C is a plausible reduction base for representation. 
Yet since this view does not actually say that representation reduces to C, it is 
compatible with minimalism.22
More generally, explanations appealing to things which are plausible 
reduction bases for representation will be unaffected by minimalism about 
representation so long as they don’t take representation as reducible to such 
things. So expressivists can accept minimalism about representation, yet argue 
that some terms, for instance, bear causal relations with the world in virtue of 
which they mean what they do, so long as they don’t think that representation is 
or is reducible to those relations. Minimalism rules out some representationalist 
explanations, but not all of them.
What if minimalism creeps all the way to these reduction bases, for instance 
causal tracking? I see no reason to think it will. Consider C, the tracking relation. 
This doesn’t bear the close conceptual relations to truth and meaning that belief, 
representation, and description do, in virtue of which minimalism crept to them. 
Nor is it part of ordinary practice to say that ethical terms causally track the 
world. So there’s no pressure on expressivists to accept minimalism here. And 
so the threat of incompatibility is answered.
6.2. Unintelligibility?
The second point is that if expressivists only have a minimal notion of rep-
resentation to hand, they will not be able to distinguish their own view from 
18   M. SIMPSON
representationalism. This is because they will not be able to characterise rep-
resentationalism, which requires a non-minimal notion. This concern rests on 
the idea that minimalism yields a minimal notion of representation; this idea 
is common in the literature (see e.g. Williams 2013, 131; Macarthur and Price 
2007, 140; Dreier 2004).
We can understand minimalists as defining a minimal notion of representa-
tion, by offering definitions like
‘F’ represents
m
 x iff x is F.
or perhaps, if we’re willing to quantify over properties
‘F’ represents
m
 things as having the property X iff X is F-ness.
Minimalists think that representation, in its ordinary sense, just is representa-
tionM: ordinary usage of ‘represents’ is best explained in terms of these schemas.
However this doesn’t mean that minimalists cannot understand non-minimal 
notions of representation which are defined differently, for instance a causal 
tracking notion defined like so:
‘F’ represents
c
 things as having the property X iff uses of ‘F’ are caused by property X
Minimalists can understand representation
c
. They can understand what causal 
tracking is. They may even think it’s sufficient for representation in general: all 
terms which representc do represent. They just think representationc isn’t rep-
resentation in its ordinary sense, and that it doesn’t explain our ordinary use of 
words like ‘represents’.
Nor do minimalists need to hear their rivals’ theories as using a minimal 
notion. A minimalist can understand a causal tracking theorist when she says: 
‘ethical terms representc the world’. She’s saying that ethical terms causally track 





’.23 The minimalist just thinks the tracking claim is false. 
So there is no threat of unintelligibility, so long as we properly understand what 
it means for minimalists to ‘only have’ a minimal notion of representation.
So neither incompatibility nor unintelligibility threatens the solution I’m 
defending. Minimalism about representation neither blocks representational-
ism tout court, nor makes it unintelligible from the expressivists’ point of view.
7. Conclusion
To conclude: Dreier’s ‘explanation’ explanation distinguishes expressivism and 
realism by their explanations of the meaning of ethical language and thought. 
Prompted by Chrisman’s ultimately unsuccessful criticism of this account, I 
argued for key three points. First, we should distinguish expressivism not from 
realism, but from representationalism. Second, we should not assume too much 
about the ontology involved in accounts which explain in terms of representa-
tion; Dreier’s account made such assumptions because of his focus on realism 
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not representationalism. Third, we should focus on explanation, as Dreier does 
– Chrisman’s second criticism of Dreier missed this fact.
As such, I argued that expressivism is distinct from representationalism 
because it does not use representation, or something that plausibly could 
reduce representation, in its explanation of ethical thought and language. This 
protects the expressivist from minimalism, since she can happily accept min-
imalism without saying that ethical language has to be explained in terms of 
representation. This gives us a solution to the problem of creeping minimalism.
After doing this I showed how the key points I defended help us resolve 
several issues raised in the recent literature: Chrisman’s criticism of Dreier, and 
Tiefensee’s criticisms of Chrisman’s inferentialism, as well as Williams’s ‘EMUs’ and 
Price’s ‘e-representation’. I argued that Chrisman himself should simply focus 
more on explanation, that we should recognise that Williams’s EMUs are expla-
nations, and that Price’s e-representation cannot be a mark of either realism or 
representationalism. Finally, I pointed out how on this solution, minimalism 
remains compatible with representationalism, and representationalism can still 
be intelligible to expressivists, despite worries to the contrary.
As such, a critical examination of Dreier’s solution to the problem of creep-
ing minimalism gives us not only a better solution to the problem, but some 
interesting results concerning philosophical concepts from the wider debate 
surrounding non-representationalist theories of meaning.
Notes
1.  See e.g. the essays in Price (2013); Gross, Tebben, and Williams (2015); Misak and 
Price (Forthcoming).
2.  Minimalism is sometimes called deflationism, but since not all authors identify 
the two, I will stick to ‘minimalism’ here. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for 
this point.
3.  See also Harcourt (2005).
4.  While Dreier focuses on constitutive explanation, in principle this account could 
be modified to use a different notion of explanation, for instance the causal-
historical notion favoured by Huw Price (2013, 20). I will disregard other senses 
of explanation in this paper.
5.  The idea that explanation is important is increasingly common. See e.g. Gross, 
Tebben, and Williams (2015, 6), Price (2004, 209), Blackburn (2010, 128), Williams 
(2013, 128), Chrisman (2011), Ridge (2014, 103ff), Zalabardo (Forthcoming) and 
Toppinen (2015).
6.  Here I follow David Lewis (1986, viii) and take realism to be the view that there 
are things, truths, properties, and so on in the relevant domain, not the view that 
truth in the domain is objective or mind-independent. On my view, error theorists 
are not realists, whatever they might think about the objectivity of ethics.
7.  Why call the expressivist’s opponent representationalist rather than, say, 
descriptivist or cognitivist? Because the recent literature has settled on 
representationalism as the name of the expressivist opponent. None of the many 
different names for expressivists, their allies, and their opponents, has ever been 
wholeheartedly accepted in the literature. However, representationalism seems 
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to be the current favourite, with several recent and influential works using it, 
including many of the most recent works cited in this paper.
8.  While the error theorist Jonas Olson has happily accepted the property view, Bart 
Streumer rejects it (both in private correspondence).
9.  This is perhaps what lies behind Blackburn’s famous claim: ‘… it is not what you end 
up saying, but how you get to say it, that defines your “ism”’ (Blackburn 1993, 7).
10.  Thanks to Jamie Dreier for this objection.
11.  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
12.  Perhaps we could treat ‘mention’ as ontologically non-committing, which would 
allow Dreier’s characterisation to include as representationalists those who say that 
ethical terms get their meaning by, for instance, representing-things-as-wrong. 
While this manoeuvre may well let Dreier’s original account meet the objections 
made above, since Dreier’s focus is on realism not representationalism, this is 
not the best reading of his original account. Indeed, in private correspondence, 
Dreier himself has maintained his focus on realism. Thanks to an anonymous 
reviewer for this point.
13.  Note that Chrisman focuses on realism rather than representationalism, though 
he does make room for non-realist representationalism. He defines realism as 
the view which says that ethical commitments are theoretical and some of them 
are true (2008, 353), which leaves representationalism as the view that ethical 
commitments are theoretical.
14.  A similar argument appears in a recent paper by Camil Golub (2017, 1400ff).
15.  Perhaps we should rethink the notion of e-representation, reading it as pertaining 
to the ‘external’ world but not limiting that world to the causally active. Thanks 
to Huw Price for this point.
16.  This is not to say that the i-/e-representation distinction is no good, nor that it 
cannot plays a useful role in discussions of pragmatism and representationalism, 
just that it can’t do the work it needs to do in the solutions Tiefensee criticised.
17.  Thanks to Christine Tiefensee and an anonymous reviewer for pressing these 
problems.
18.  See Price (2015); Brandom (2013); Williams (2013); Blackburn (2013); Price (2013); 
Gibbard (2015); Gross, Tebben, and Williams (2015).
19.  See Blackburn (2013) and Gibbard (2015), though Price (2011, 2013) has argued 
that they should reject representationalism completely.
20.  See Horwich (1998a, 1998b); Williams (2013); Price (2011) for claims like this.
21.  See Horwich (1998a, 1998b); Price (2015) for claims like this.
22.  As Adams and Aizawa (2010, §4.1) point out, many of those who accept a causal 
theory of content think that causal relations are only sufficient and not necessary 
for meaning, and hence do not accept reductionism.
23.  Compare: a behaviourist does not impose his behaviourism when interpreting 
a dualist’s claims about the mind. When the dualist says ‘mental states are not 
merely behavioural states’, the behaviourist does not hear the absurd ‘behavioural 
states are not merely behavioural states’. He does not reinterpret the dualist: he 
merely disagrees with her.
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